The Correctional System Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

The Correctional System - Case Study Example The way prisoners were treated across the eras varies widely. "Criminal excesses of the 1920’s to 1930’s hardened the public’s attitude†¦J. Edgar Hoover†¦pushed for the now famous (or infamous) super maximum Alcatraz, which soon showed itself to be to expensive to run and maintain† (â€Å"Prison,† 2010, p. 1). Alcatraz was a maximum security prison on an island which is infamous for having housed many bitter and hardened criminals. The idea was that it was on an island so no one was able to leave. Alcatraz was one of the toughest prisons from which one could escape because, basically the security system was so complex. Not only that, but somehow, after having escaped from the prison itself, one would have to then get off the island. This required exceptional thought and planning. There were a few, and prisoners did escape from Alcatraz, although it was difficult. To contrast, in the 1800’s, â€Å"The convicted were not stripped of t heir belongings like in today's prisons, but they were searched for weapons or objects that could be used to escape†¦Many times the prisoners died of starvation and dehydration† (â€Å"Prison Life,† 2010, p. 1). In contrast, the prisoners of today are strip-searched and told that all their belongings must be put in a holding bin. These belongings are kept for the person until they are released from jail. Also, prisoners began to be treated better starting in the 20th century, and it increasingly got better from there on out. In the 1800’s. In the 1800's, as stated, prisoners were left to die in many cases, barely being given enough food on which they could sustain themselves. However, with the advent of psychiatric units and such, prisoners began to be regarded as people which were not lost causes to be put in a room and then allow someone to throw away the key. Rather, a more humanistic perspective was taken on in the mid-20th century in order to make the correctional system that we have today, where people are seen as being able to be rehabilitated instead of simply jailed. III. Secure Holding and/or Monitoring of Offenders The main difference in holding facilities between 1800 and 2000 is the fact that they simply got better. Living conditions improved over time for the inmate as time wore on. After awhile it was realized that prisoners couldn't just be allowed to languish in dirty, disorganized cells with dirt floors and a bench for a bed. People took note that prisoners were people too, and that they deserved a certain standard of living, however menial. IV. Alternatives to Incarceration Alternatives to incarceration involved being put in a chain gang in the early days (1800's till the 1950's). Although chain gangs can be seen today in the 21st century, usually those are for community service projects and are not as common. However,

Singer on Animal Rights Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Singer on Animal Rights - Essay Example Several human activists have advocated the making and imposition of animal rights. This struggle on behalf of their loyal friends is not new and lasts over the last numerous decades. One of the most prominent human rights activists is Peter Singer who has an Australian origin. A renowned Philosopher and the professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, the sixty four (64) year old humanist has voiced his thoughts in favor of human rights for about four decades now. Peter Singer’s work â€Å"All Animals are Equal†, that came into print in the later part of the 1980s, highlights his decades old philosophy of safeguarding animal rights by voicing and maintaining the stance of respect of animals. This text is an attempt to voice Singer’s thoughts that he has advocated in the said work. The main theme of this article of Peter Singer is that animals, may they be ‘humans’ or ‘non humans’ deserve respect. He is quoted in this article as: †Å"I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species.† Singer does not emphasize that animals should have rights like humans but emphasizes that their rights should be recognized. He does not mean to say that animals are just like humans or should be treated just like humans. All he wants to say is that the discriminating factor between them should not be that one is an animal and the other is a human. Regardless of the species of a living being, rights should be associated with every individual thus attaching importance to their interests. The author compares the ambitions of human beings to those of an animal. Man has each and every step of his life planned. Every minute that passes brings him closer to his next planned task and then moreover to the next one. Animals however do not follow any such scheduled activity. Singer emphasizes that this fantasizing of humans does n ot give them any edge over animals with respect to rights. â€Å"If a being suffers,† he says, â€Å"there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.† The famous activist proposes a situation where a building might accidentally be on fire. A human and a dog would be distressfully caught into the fire in exactly the same manner. They’re both hurt to the same extent and have become immobile. In such a situation, the author emphasizes that, both the human being and the animal have equal rights of being picked up as the first option of rescue. He shuns the thought that since a man has his whole planned life to live he should be the first choice of being picked up by rescue personnel. Singer emphasizes that there potentially is no difference in the suffering of the distressing animal and the human being. ‘The Human Pain’ he says has the same intensity as the animal’s pain. He strictly shuns that merely th e thought that human suffering is more than animal suffering should not make the picking up of the human being as the first choice. On the contrary, if the person suffering may be your loved one then you may ask the rescue team to pick him up first, but not otherwise. Singer states that of all the things that may exist, human beings have only and only a single edge over other species and that is the fact that they belong to the â€Å"Human Species† or â€Å"Homo Sapiens†. Singer emphasizes by saying, â€Å"Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they

Step Analysis For Cadburys In India Marketing Essay

Step Analysis For Cadburys In India Marketing Essay A method used by management that provides the analysis which is based on the four external factors that may affect the organizations performance. Social, Technological, Economic and Political are the four factors. This strategical tool helps the profitability of the company. Step Analysis Factors SocialSocial: The social factor helps a company to understand the ethical, cultural beliefs, demographics, lifestyles and education. These changes influence the growth of the company. Technological: The change in the technological factors can change the companys competitive area. Environmental, ecological ways. New strategies and products and the cost of improvising and innovation. And in the development of the product. Economic: The economic structures and its varies changes at the stock exchange and the interest, and inflation rates and nations economic rules and performances. They directly have a great impact on the company. Political: The changes in the government and pressures and opportunities and changes in the political system and leadership and their values will so affect the company. It also includes the taxes and rules and political grounds and involvement in the business. Step analysis for Cadburys in India The word chocolate has been traced back in ancient times from central America -civilizations Aztec and Maya ,Chocolate made from roasted cocoa beans was mostly enjoyed and relished all over the history as a drink . In ancient times as the expensive cocoa were gifted when a newly born arrives in a family or any religious occasions. Even the traders used to exchange it for jade, clothes etc., till recent times the chocolate has been just the plain chocolate. However Sir Hans Sloane an English doctor brought chocolate milk recipe from South America to England. According to his recipe the original Cadbury milk chocolate was prepared, later it was sold to the Cadburys. The cocoa crillo is harvested only 10% world wide, 90% of it is hybrid and from forestero trees and varieties are produced mainly in West Africa. The hottest region is the right soil to grow this plantation for cocoa. The procedure to prepare chocolate are: Harvest Fermentation Drying Cleaning Roasting Crushing and shelling Blending Grinding Cocoa butter Cocoa powder Kneading Rolling Conching In Birmingham 1824 at bull street England, John Cadbury used to do vending for coffee, tea and drinking chocolate. He started to concentrate on the chocolate drinks and beverages. He was also appointed as the Royal by the queen. He also shifted from the tea business stopped the tea shipment and started importing cocoa into UK. He tried so many different varieties. Although it was economically not an easy price to the consumer so he had a tie up with his brother and started his venture into Cadburys chocolate making business. One of the best inventions in the confectionary industry was Cadburys Dairy Milk which was a moulded chocolate and was introduced in 1905 although after so many brands with leading chocolate companies the Dairy Milk shows 95 years later a success and recognition. Step Analysis Social: The story of Cadbury dairy milk started in 1905 at Bourneville UK but the journey with chocolate lovers in India began in 1948. The UK confectioner Kraft foods and Cadburys had a deal in the business and they wanted to enter the international market. However they targeted a little tough market which I could say as India could not accept any foreign products so easily but still as C.Y.Pal non executive chairman of Cadbury India quotes India is a very happy story for Kraft and Cadbury. Kraft was initially trying hard with its products to put-up on the shelfs in a market store like tobolerone, milka, cheese, Oreo cookies etc although all were under one umbrella. Indians could not accept it so easily. More than 60 yrs has been passed Cadburys has now become the countries biggest confectioner. The barriers it had leaped and came up with different products in chocolates, drinks, gums, candies etc was appreciatiable. The Indian customer no matter how advanced or sophisticated they m ight be the traditional culture of mithai could not replace the chocolates Indians have a massive sweet tooth but its filled with mithai but not chocolate says (Ramesh Srinivas executive director of KPMG Advisory services India) even huge multinational company like Cadburys could not crack the market as the consumption of chocolate in India is 54gms per captia. Cadburys worked out with amul to make mithai and add chocolate like Indo Western style but it did not attract customers so Cadbury did intensive research and started promoting through different media and hit the slogan just for kids in 90s. Later on they shifted to the campaign for teenagers who shared the real taste of life, memorable instances which stayed in everyones life like a girl dancing in the cricket field this campaign was awarded the campaign of century in India. From here they targeted the campaign of consumption of chocolates amongst adults which was portrayed by Mr. Amitabh Bachan were different relations, spec ial moments, festive occasions, reunions were showed with happiest moments with a slogan kuch meeta ho jaya this is an excellent technique of reaching the Indian cultural barrier of mithai the promotion of Cadbury cleverly put up to equalize a chocolate and a mithai. Technological Cadburys entered the Indian market where people could recognize the brand only with a purple cover. Technically the taste of the Indians in the food or confectioners are different so the varieties that Indians crave about the purple cover should not be just the Dairy Milk so they came up with fruits and nuts, crackle, roast almond which were very famous in youth and adults to attract the kids they started with goodies and rewards with the purchase of Cadbury chocolate. The approach through media with best quality and mind lingering advertisements were done by the creative team who held up the Cadbury chocolate as luxury compared to other small confectioners in India. The punch lines used with Indians own famous game cricket the sport was also enhanced. People started liking the marketing strategy and the campaigning and it dominated 70% of the share market. The snack time in the evenings was a huge market in India they came up with Cadburys bytes. Cadbury has maintained high quality and value for money it also made Cadbury dairy milk as a dessert with slogan something sweet after meal and for kids the wowie chocolate with Disney characters embossed in it. The 2in 1 dairy milk a combination of white chocolate and milk chocolate. Economic The Cadburys and Krafts acquisition was priced but they individually grew on their strength in most of the countries. Krafts is the key market globally when they ventured together but in India they started leaning on Cadburys more, so it was ahead in confectionary business. The nestle was very far distant as number 2 when compared Cadbury .According to the marketing research firm-AC.Nelson Cadbury brand with milk addictive bourn vita has earned 70% of Indias market and earned us$425 million and 30% of sugar boiled confectionary category with us$1 billion i.e., 30%of it. The network of business selling its product across India is 1.2 billion shops as India is still agrarian society although the number of super markets or hyper markets are more the food is still bought at neighborhood stores called kirana shops. No matter Cadbury tried launching its first apple drink, dollops ice-cream, and the Indian customer recognizes the purple color as Cadburys brand. Cadbury had to change purchas ing price in India when globally it was around 10% with inclusion of interest, and taxes etc., and 27% margin was paid by krafts. The low prices with which Cadbury had the foothold in India and also business technique of the retailers in India to do business on daily working capital and fast moving products only and this increased the marketing strategy by segregating their products into different lines like gums, chocolates, mints, drinks, etc., Even if foreign markets would like to put up their confectionaries the pricing would be a big criteria and loss. The localization strategy has been adopted though slower but the products are made to the Indian customers taste. Most of the retailers do not have refridgirators, so they came up with mini packs which with-stand the heat of India with retaining the chocolate inside without any outer influence in dairy milk products. The costing of the packaging was 50 cents earlier it is costing 4 cents now. This strategy has helped the retailer s and the consumer and they were happy as Cadbury has been maintaining, quality, price and adapting Indian consumers taste. This has been amendable and kept the pace of making Indian customer to think that the value for money has been maintained and satisfied according to the Indian culture and taste. Political The worlds biggest confectionary across the globe had stepped into India with mouth watering brand the Cadbury chocolate. Although it took 60 years to register in the Indian market it employed 50,000across the globe says in 60 countries. They had a slogan in India creating brands people love. It also worked with Indian government in development of cocoa cultivation; it did also conduct research in kerala the agricultural university and educated the farmers. And right now its operating four categories in India like chocolate confectionaries, milk food drinks, gums and candies. Salmonella scare was biggest threat to the Cadbury Schweppes seven products globally. Salmonella is bacteria which was caused by a leaking pipe it might have occurred while the mixture of chocolate crumb was taking place at marl brook chocolate plant which is made into milk chocolate. This was not stated to the food standard agency as it had to get the stock back of one million chocolate bars and this contamination of bacteria costed them threat to health and they were charged 30 million pounds. They were with cases of 6 charges against them for breaching health and safety legislation but they took the step and retained the entire stock. The commitment to environment was the water conservation with unique new techniques at Bangalore factory; it started using solar energy to reduce the carbon di oxide and also driving towards the global warming. There was a major issue of child labour in south Africa with cocoa cultivation as its the 90%of worlds biggest producers and they fought for it. They also created and supported needs for underprivileged children. They started spreading smiles on the innocent faces not only with mouth lingering Cadbury chocolate but also good quality for any person in need. Methodology The gold standard is the consideration which is defined for chocolate in India for Cadburys. The brand which was a deal stuck with kraft foods did lot of international business however, when they stepped into India, Kraft had to depend on Cadburys in the market. Where a culturally different customer did not accept krafts brands, after a slow persuasion the purple covered product that is Cadburys has taken over 70% of confectionary market in the long journey of 60 years. The excellent marketing strategies which they used to register and connecting to Indian values through slogans which touched Indian customers heart and brought smile on their face from a kid to adults. The strategy was proven brand loyaltys best example with customer centric business. Although it did not realize to go with customers taste previously they faced lot of setbacks. Conclusion The taste of life a slogan which connected the people for a a long decade itself shows how the product has emerged as no.1 most trusted in Mumbai in India. It also is considered as marketing leader who changed the taste of India. Cadbury did not step back with the nutritional elements in its product line. The candies and gumbs have been strategically registered in a Childs mind also giving the difference the salty bytes and sweet bytes. Cadburys bytes like snacks to Cadbury chocolate varieties. The quality. The value, the purpose which drove lot of consumers to a brand with such immense loyalty and they have trusted the beautiful product which I can say that every generation has relished. And Cadburys had fought back with all the myths and giving facts of benefits from chocolate or rather creating world wide study of CHOCOLOGY.

Identifying Areas of Weakness in Thorntons :: Business Management, Case Study

In Thornton’s, there are areas of weakness that need to be reconciled in training and development, nothing is perfect is in business, but Thornton’s must strive to try and establish the weaknesses in their methods and develop new and more effective plans and systems for the way they function. An example of this would be that some employees use the company for qualifications such as in the Administration department, training is used or use of I.T and qualifications are given out when staff complete training or in the manufacturing department where training is given in Health and Safety and packaging skills are trained. Employees may stay in the company until they are trained in whatever qualification and skills they need and then could leave the company, deserting the workforce and causing the company to loose money on recruiting and selecting new employees and then more costs on the training and developing of these new staff. A suggestion to improve this weakness is to wait for employees to be at the company for a certain period of time before training them up, although this may be difficult at the start of the process as the business needs employees with the correct skills, in the long run this could be an advantage as once employees are trained, the company will probably retain them as if they have been at the company for a certain period of time, they will probably stick to it resulting in the retention of staff. To compensate for poorly trained staff at the beginning of the process. Agencies could be used to employ temporary staff, although this would be expensive, it would result in being cheaper than employees leaving and costs on recruiting and training new employees. Another suggestion to this situation would be only using in house training and promotion as if staff have worked at the company for a certain period of time, they will probably be staying at the company in the long run, this could also help with staff motivation and incentives for staff to work hard if they see a promotion in their midst. Another area of weakness in Thortons is that the business only trains staff in one particular part of their job, not all the skills that are needed in all of the departments. Although this would probably be costly and would take time it would be effective as if staff were absent, it would be easier for their jobs to be covered by other staff, as they would be qualified in all aspects of the business.

Reaction Time Essay

This experiment aimed to determine the reaction time of the test participant and using the subtractive method identify the selection time and identification time of the participant. The experiments had one participant who participated in a total of 6 experiments; two experiments required a simple reaction with a single stimulus and 4 experiments that required a more complicated reaction. Keywords Subtractive method – the procedure of estimating the time it takes to perform various cognitive operations. Simple reaction – this reaction time task has a single stimulus and requires only a single reaction Choice reaction – In this reaction time task there are more than one stimulus and more than one response. Each stimulus has its own response. Donders A B and C reactions – In this reaction time task there is more than one stimulus but only one stimulus is linked with a response. Introduction Donders A B and C reactions have been used to determine the time it takes to perform cognitive operations for quite some time now. In these experiments we aimed to use light and sound stimuli in the react time tasks to determine individual base time, Identification time and selection time. Using one female college student (23 years) and one person recording the different reaction times. The experiments took place over a period of two days, with the first experiment taking place on one afternoon and the next 5 experiments a week later in the afternoon again. Methods Apparatus and materials One pen and paper to record reaction times, one Reaction task machine which came equipped with headphones for sound stimuli, a screen for visual stimuli and a panel of buttons colored red, yellow and green for responses. Procedure Pilot Test The participant stood on the reaction task side of the machine and put on the headphones after having been already instructed to press the red button when they heard both sound and visual stimulus. The observer then set the machine to pilot test, simple reaction test and selected the color red. The observer then gave a visual signal to the participant to let them know the experiment was about to begin. In this pilot test the participant was required to press the red button each time they saw the red light flash when it was accompanied with a voice that said red. At the end of a test a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. The light and sound stimuli were given for a total of 20 times if the participant did not make any mistakes (that is pressed the red but only when both stimuli were given) then the pilot test was completed successfully, if not the machine would reset itself and would have to be set again and the test would be administered again. This stage was also a learning phase for both participants and observers as both were using this type of machine for the first time. Experiment 1 The participant stood on the test side of the machine and put on a pair of headphones after having been already instructed they were required to press the red button each time they saw a red light. The observer then set the machine to real test, selected simple reaction and selected the color red. . There was no signal given to the participant as to when exactly the experiment would begin by the observer but they were told to be ready as soon as they saw the light the experiment had begun. At the end of the experiment a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. The stimulus that required a reaction in the experiment was given 19 times and the experiment was only complete if the participant made no mistakes. Each reaction time was noted by the observer. Experiment 2 The participant stood on the test side of the machine and put on a pair of headphones after having been already instructed they were required to press the red button only when they saw the red light flash across the light panel. The participant was instructed not to press a button for any other colour. The observer then set the machine to real test, selected selection reaction and pressed the clear colour button as well as the red. . There was no signal given to the participant as to when exactly the experiment would begin by the observer but they were told to be ready as soon as they saw the light the experiment had begun. The stimulus that required a reaction in the experiment was given 19 times and the experiment was only complete if the participant made no mistakes. . At the end of the experiment a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. Each reaction time was noted by the observer. Experiment 3 The participant stood on the test side of the machine and put on a pair of headphones after having been already instructed to press the button that corresponded with the colour they saw flash across the screen i.e. see green light, press green button. There was no signal given to the participant as to when exactly the experiment would begin by the observer but they were told to be ready as soon as they saw the light the experiment had begun. At the end of the experiment a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. The stimulus that required a reaction in the experiment was given 19 times and the experiment was only complete if the participant made no mistakes. Each reaction time was noted by the observer. Experiment 4 The participant stood on the test side of the machine and put on a pair of headphones after having been already instructed to press only the red button when they heard the high frequency sound. The observer then set the machine to real test, simple reaction test and selected high frequency sound. There was no signal given to the participant as to when exactly the experiment would begin by the observer but they were told to be ready as soon as they heard the sound the experiment had begun. At the end of the experiment a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. The stimulus that required a reaction in the experiment was given 19 times and the experiment was only complete if the participant made no mistakes. Each reaction time was noted by the observer. Experiment 5 The participant stood on the test side of the machine and put on a pair of headphones after having been already instructed to press the red button only when they heard the high frequency sound. The observer then set the machine to real test, choice reaction test and selected all the frequencies. There was no signal given to the participant as to when exactly the experiment would begin by the observer but they were told to be ready as soon as they heard the sound the experiment had begun. At the end of the experiment a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. The stimulus that required a reaction in the experiment was given 19 times and the experiment was only complete if the participant made no mistakes. Each reaction time was noted by the observer. Experiment 6 The participant stood on the test side of the machine and put on a pir of headphones after having been already instructed to press the button that corresponded with the frequency of sound they heard, i.e. high frequency= red button, middle frequency=green button and low frequency=yellow button. The observer then set the machine to real test, choice reaction test and selected all the frequencies. This time there was no hand signal given to the participant by the observer but they were told to be ready as soon as they heard the sound the experiment had begun. At the end of the experiment a hand signal was given by the observer to the participant to let them know the task was over. The stimulus that required a reaction in the experiment was given 19 times and the experiment was only complete if the participant made no mistakes. Each reaction time was noted by the observer.

Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu

In Progress. Abstract: In this paper, we discuss how and why institutions— broadly, the economic and political organization of societies— affect economic incentives and outcomes. After briefly surveying a number of theories of institutional differences across countries, we focus on two questions: why societies may choose institutions that are not good for economic development, and why institutions, even bad Institutions, persist.In light of the Ideas we develop, we discuss three case studies of Institutions alluding and persistence: the united States, India and Guatemala. L. Introduction Institutions, defined broadly as the political and economic organization of societies, differ markedly across countries and over time. For example, until recently, a large number of societies were organized along socialist lines, with widespread collective ownership of the means of production and centrally planned resource allocation, while much of the rest of the world was capitalist, with predominantly private ownership and resources allocated Vela markets.For much of the 1 8th and 9th centuries, a number of societies, Including the Caribbean, much of Central and Latin America, and parts of Asia, were organized with political and economic power concentrated in the hands of a small elite, and relied on productive relationships based on slavery and forced labor. In contrast, economic and political power was more equally distributed in parts of Europe, North America and Australia, and the majority of laborers were free.Similarly, as emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), North and Whiniest (1989) and Till (1 990), there were Important differences In the organization of the European societies during the 17th century. While England and the Netherlands had developed limited governments, France and Spain had absolutist regimes.Economic theory and basic common sense suggest that differences in the organization of society should have an effect on economic outcomes: when institutions ensure that a potential investor has property rights over the proceeds from his Investments, he Is more likely to invest than when he expects the fruits of his efforts to be taken by other parties In the economy or by the government. An obvious hypothesis is then to link variations in economic performance across countries to their institutions. We refer to this point of view as the institutions hypothesis.According to one version of this hypothesis, what is crucial is whether the organization of the society ensures that a broad cross-section of the society have effective property rights, so that those with productive emphasis on â€Å"a broad cross-section of the society' is meant to capture the notion that it is not sufficient for the rights of a small elite, landowners, dictators or Politburo members, to be enforced. Citizens need to have effective property rights, and be involved in politics, at least some degree, to ensure the continuation of these repertory rights in the future.Do we see marked differences in the economic performance of societies with different institutions? The examples mentioned in the first paragraph suggest so: while West Germany prospered with a capitalist system, East Germany did much less well under socialism. While Western Europe, North America and Australia grew rapidly, the elite-dominated societies of the Caribbean, Central America and India stagnated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. As emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), while England and the Netherlands prospered during the 17th century, Spain and France failed to do so.Also telling are cases where large changes in institutions are correlated with radically changed growth paths. Examples of this are Argentina in the sass's with the rise of populism and Person, South Korea during the early sass's with the transition from the Rhea to the Park regime, and Indonesia in 1965 with the transition between Saguaro and Short. In addition to these selective examp les, much empirical evidence suggests that institutional differences are a major source of the differences in economic performance across countries.For example, cross-country work by a number of economists and political scientists found a first-order effect of institutions on growth or the level of income (e. G. , Knack and Keeper, 1995, or Hall and Jones, 1999). More recently, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) we found that as much as % of the income gap between the top and bottom of the world income distribution may be due to differences in their institutions. 4 But these findings pose as many questions as they answer: 1 . If some institutions generate more income and growth, why do a large number of societies adopt institutions that are bad for economic development? . Why do institutions that are detrimental to economic performance persist rather than being overhauled at the first opportunity? Despite the importance of these questions for understanding differences in econ omic performance across countries, there is relatively little research on this topic. In this paper, we develop a number of conjectures related to these questions. Then, in light of these ideas, we discuss three case studies of institution building and persistence: the U. S. , India and Guatemala.In the process, we also provide a brief survey of a number of theories of comparative institutions. II. Institutions As emphasized in the introduction, our focus is on the set of institutions— the organization of society— that determine economic incentives. Why such institutions and social arrangements will affect economic outcomes is clear: economic actors will only undertake investments when they expect to be rewarded for their spending and effort. In a society where property rights are not well enforced, investment and output will be low.We therefore take the degree of enforcement of property rights to be a central feature of the institutions and the broad organization of a society. To of private property, which we take to correspond to a set of institutions ensuring that a broad cross-section of society have effective property rights. 2. Extractive institutions, which place political power in the hands of a small elite. With extractive institutions, the majority of the population does not have effective property rights, since the political power of the elite means that they can hold up the citizens after they undertake their investments.We expect institutions of private property to encourage investment and development, while extractive institutions are less likely to dead to high investment and successful economic outcomes. Notice that there is more to institutions than the legal code or the formal definition of property rights at a point in time; in particular, political institutions matter. This is for the simple reason that in a society where there are few constraints on political elites, these agents can change the legal code or manipulate the ex isting property rights to their advantage. Therefore, effective constraints on political elites are an essential ingredient of institutions of private property. In reality, there are many intermediate cases teens the extremes of institutions of private property and extractive institutions, and a complex interaction between the exact form of the political and economic institutions and whether they provide effective property rights protection to citizens. There is also a deep and difficult question of how the state commits to providing property rights to the citizens (see Whiniest, 1997, for a discussion of this problem).To limit the discussion, we do not focus on these issues. So what determines whether a society ends up with institutions of private property or extractive institutions? Let us distinguish four broad theories, which we call: 1. The efficient institutions view. 2. The incidental institutions view. 3. The rent-seeking view. 4. The inappropriate institutions view. We now discuss what we mean by these different views, and examine some selective examples of institutional theories falling within each category. . The Efficient Institutions View According to this view, societies will choose the institutions that maximize their total surplus. How this surplus will be distributed among different groups or agents does not affect the choice of institutions. The underlying reasoning of this view comes from the Cease Theorem. Ronald Cease (1960) argued that when different economic parties could negotiate costless, they will be able to bargain to internalize potential externalities.The farmer, who suffers from the pollution created by the nearby factory, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution. The same reasoning can be applied to political situations. If the current laws or institutions benefit a certain group while creating a disproportionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions. By doing so they will increase the size of the total surplus (â€Å"the pie† that they have to divide between themselves), and they can hen bargain over the distribution of this additional surplus.Many different versions of the efficient institutions view have been proposed. Demesne (1967) argued that private property emerged from common property when land become sufficiently scarce and valuable that it was efficient to privative it. Other famous examples are Case's (1936) earlier work and the more formal analysis by Grossman and Hart (1986), is more concerned with the governance of firms or markets than the political organization of societies, but his reasoning was guided by the same principle.North ND Thomas applied this reasoning to the nature of feudal institutions arguing that they were an efficient contract between serfs and Lords. While Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how different parties will reach agreement to achieve efficient institutions, Becker (1960) and Whitman (1989) have invest igated how democracies can reach such agreements via competition among pressure groups and political parties.In their view, an inefficient institution cannot be stable because a political entrepreneur has an incentive to propose a better institution and with the extra surplus generated will be able to make him more attractive to voters. We believe that, despite correctly emphasizing certain forces that are likely to be at work, the efficient institutions view does not provide the right framework for an analysis of the differences in institutions across countries. Both historical and econometric evidence suggests that the economic costs to societies of extractive institutions have been substantial.For example, our estimates in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) suggest that changing Insignia's or Sierra Lens's institutions to those of Chile loud lead, in the long run, to a more than 7-fold increase in these countries' income. It is difficult to argue that these institutions are t herefore efficient for Nigeria, Sierra Leone or many other less-developed countries in Africa or Latin America. In the rest of the paper, we therefore focus on theories of institutions where societies may end up with institutions that are not optimal for aggregate growth or income. 2.The Incidental Institutions View The efficient institutions view is explicitly based on economic reasoning: the costs and benefits of different institutions are weighed against each other to determine which institutions should prevail. Efficiency arises because individuals calculate according to the social costs and benefits. Institutions are therefore choices. A different approach, popular among many political scientists and sociologists, is to downplay choices over institutions, but think of institutions as the byproduct of other social interactions. Here, we discuss three such theories.The first is the theory developed by Barrington Moore (1966) in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, th e second is Till's (1990) and Herb's (2001) theory of state formation, hill the third is Burner's (1976) theory of the emergence of capitalism in England. Barrington Moore constructed his famous theory in an attempt to explain the different paths of political development in Britain, Germany and Russia. In particular, he investigated why Britain had evolved into a democracy, while Germany succumbed to fascism and Russia had a communist revolution.Moore stressed the extent of centralization of agriculture and resulting labor relations in the countryside, the strength of the ‘bourgeoisie,' and the nature of class coalitions. In his theory, democracy emerged when there was a strong, politically assertive, immemorial middle class, and when agriculture had commercialese so that there were no feudal labor relations in the countryside. Fascism arose when the middle classes were weak and entered into a political coalition with landowners.Finally, a agriculture was not commercialese and rural labor was repressed through feudal relationships. In Moor's theory, therefore, class coalitions and the way agriculture is organized determine which political institutions will emerge. Although Moore is not explicitly concerned with economic development, it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end up with institutions that do not maximize income or growth, for example, when they take the communist revolution path.While this theory is highly suggestive and clearly captures some of the potentially significant comparative facts there are clear problems with it. For instance, though Moor's remark â€Å"no bourgeoisie, no democracy' is famous, it is not clear from his analysis whether this is Just an empirical correlation or a causal theory. More generally, Moore does not clarify the connection between the formation of class coalitions and political outcomes. It is also not clear whether this theory is empirically successful.There are many examples of societ ies with relatively strong capitalist classes in Latin America, such as Argentina and Chile, which did not make the transition to a consolidated democracy until recently. In fact, in these societies capitalist classes appear to have supported the coups against democracy, suggesting that the role of the poor segments of the society (the working class) in inducing demagnification could be more important than that of the bourgeoisie (see Archduchesses, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, Guacamole and Robinson, Bibb).In a very different vein, Till (1990), building on the Hibernia tradition, proposed a theory of the formation of modern states. He argued extensively that modern state institutions such as fiscal systems, bureaucracy and parliaments are closely related to the need to raise resources to fight wars and thus arose in places with incessant inter-state competition. Herbs (2001) has recently provided a substantive extension of this line of research by applying it to the evolution of st ate institutions in Africa.He argues that the poor functioning of many modern African states is due to the fact that they caked the features–high population density and inter-state warfare— necessary for the emergence of the modern state. Although interesting and sweeping, this theory does not seem to accord well with a number of major facts. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we documented that among the former colonies, it was the less densely settled places that became richer.In fact, North America, Australia and New Zealand were very sparsely settled in 1 500, especially when compared to West Africa around the same time. Despite this, they developed effective states and institutions of private property. This suggests that the issues stressed by Till and Herbs are not the major determinants of institutions, at least, in the context of the development of institutions among the former European colonies, including Africa. Burner's (1976) theory of the rise of capitalism in Europe can also be thought as an example of the incidental institutions view.Although Brenner subscribes to the Marxist view of feudalism as an extractive institution (see next subsection), he interprets the rise of capitalism as the byproduct of the collapse of existing social institutions after the Black Death. Brenner argues that the decline of feudalism resulted from the successful class struggle by the relatively powerful British peasantry. Brenner, however, believes that the peasantry's aim was not to build capitalism; capitalism just emerged like an incidental phoenix from the ashes of feudalism.Because, economic growth required this set of (extractive) institutions to be replaced by capitalist institutions. Therefore, Burner's work also gives us an incidental- institutions theory for why some societies grow faster. None of these theories provide a framework that is at the same time consistent tit the first-order facts of comparative development and useful for generating predictions. Therefore, it is difficult to apply these theories to understand why some countries develop extractive institutions.Moreover, being trained as economists, we find it to be a shortcoming of this group of theories that institutions and political outcomes arise as byproducts, not as the direct consequences of actions taken by rational agents. The fact that the key outcomes are byproducts of other interactions, not choices, leads to the additional problem that these theories often do not generate tight empirical predictions (I. E. Comparative static). But an analysis of comparative development, above all else, requires comparative static results regarding when institutions of private property will emerge.In the remainder of the paper, we therefore focus on the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views to build a simple framework for comparative development. 3. The Rent-seeking View According to this view, institutions are not always chosen by the whole so ciety (and not for the benefit of the whole society), but by the groups that control political power at the time (perhaps as a result of conflict with other groups demanding more rights). These groups will choose the institutions that maximize their own rents, and the institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total surplus.For example, institutions that enforce property rights by restricting state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler who wants to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler would be reducing his own future rents, so may well prefer extractive institutions to institutions of private property. Therefore, equilibrium institutions will not be those that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the powerful groups. Why doesn't a Cease theorem type reasoning apply?Although a large literature, especially in industrial organization, has emphasized how informational problems may limit the empirical applications of the Cease theorem, we believe that the main reason for the non-applicability of the Cease theorem in politics is commitment problems (see Guacamole, 2001, for a more detailed discussion of this issue). If a ruler has political power concentrated in his hands, he cannot commit not to expropriate assets or revenues in the future. Effective property rights require that he credibly relinquishes political power to some extent.But according to the Occasion bargain, he has to be compensated for what he could have received using this power. Herein lies the problem. When he relinquishes his power, then he has no guarantees that he will receive the promised payments in the future. Therefore, by their very nature, institutions that regulate political and social power create commitment problems, and prevent Occasion bargains that are necessary to reach efficient outcomes. As an application, consider the decision of a powerful rich elite to mount a coup in a populist redistributive regime, such as that of Salvador Allendale in Chile in 1973.By undertaking a coup, the rich will ensure that economically. Why wouldn't the elite enter into a Occasion bargain with Allendale who would wish to place future restrictions on taxes so as to remove the threat of the coup? The problem, as pointed out and analyzed in Guacamole and Robinson (2001 a), is that the democracy cannot promise not to increase taxes again once the threat of the coup disappears. By its very nature, taxes are set by the politically powerful agents, determined by the institutions at that time.Promises made at the past may be worthless when they are not backed by political power. The first systematic development of this point of view is the economics literature is North (1981), who argued in the chapter on â€Å"A Neoclassical Theory of the State† that agents who controlled the state should be modeled as self-interested. He then argued that the set of property rights wh ich they would choose for society would be those that maximized their payoff and because of transactions costs' these would not necessarily be the set which maximized social welfare.Though his analysis does not clarify what he meant by transactions costs, problems of commitment might be one mispronunciation for this. The notion that elites may opt for extractive institutions to increase their incomes is of course also present in much of the Marxist and dependency theory literature. For example, Dobb (1948), Brenner (1976) and Hilton (1981) saw feudalism, contrary to North and Thomas (1976)g's model, as a set of institutions designed to extract rents from the peasants at the expense of social welfare.Dependency theorists such as Wholesalers (1974-1982), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and Cards and Falsetto (1979) argued that the international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countries to the benefit of developed Mounties. Perhaps, the earliest, and often igno red, contribution to this line of reasoning is in the book by Beard (1913). Anticipating many of the insights of rational choice political science literature, Beard argued that the U. S.Constitution was an institution designed to benefit those who wrote it (such as James Madison) at the expense of the rest of society. Another important example of inefficient institutions designed to extract rents from the society is the Spanish colonial system (Stein and Stein, 1970, Coauthors, 1978, Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). Finally, the notion that leaver is an inefficient institution designed to extract rents from slaves is also widespread (for example, Williams, 1944, Geneses, 1963, Beckoned, 1972).More recent, and for our purposes more relevant, contributions in this tradition have sought to explain comparative development. For example, in the context of Africa, Bates (1981) formulated an influential and important theory based on rent-seeking by elites. Bates argued that when elites were no t invested in the productive sectors of the economy, mostly agriculture in the context of Africa, and had to rely on urban interests to remain in power, they were likely to distort prices, for example by using marketing boards to transfer resources from the rural areas to the cities.The implications of this for political stability and economic growth were disastrous. Anger and Soulful (1997, 2000) have used related ideas to analyze long-term development in the Americas. They argued that the different paths of development observed in North and Latin America in the last 300 years were due to institutional differences. In North America institutions promoted development, in Latin America they did not. Why did Latin America develop a set of institutions that impeded Caribbean, the factor endowments were suitable for growing crops such as sugarcane.Such crops had large technical scale economies and could be cultivated by slaves, factors that led to large concentrations of landownership an d repressive institutions designed to control labor. Therefore, despite their costs for economic development, extractive institutions were adopted by elites who benefited from the system. On the other hand, in North America, factor endowments were suitable for growing crops with limited scale economies such as wheat, and this led to an egalitarian distribution of land, income and political power.Their theory therefore emphasizes the impact of factor endowments and technology on inequality and institutions building, and ultimately economic development. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000, 2001 a), we developed a complementary theory, emphasizing how European colonialists set up institutions of private property in areas where they settled in large numbers, since these institutions were directly affecting their own investments and well-being. This led us to emphasize how European settlements ere often conducive to the development of institutions of private property in the colonies .In contrast, European colonists introduced or took over existing extractive institutions in other colonies. They were more likely to do so when they did not settle, for example due to an adverse disease environment, and when extractive institutions were more profitable, for example, as in Central America where the densely settled large population could be forced to work for low wages in plantations or mines. These extractive institutions did not benefit the society as a whole, but they were inefficacy for the Europeans, who held the political power and were the extractors.We believe that the rent-seeking view provides the best framework for thinking about why certain countries ended up with extractive institutions, and provides a number of useful comparative static, which will be discussed in Section Ill. 4. The Inappropriate Institutions View According to this view, institutions may be efficient when they are introduced, but they are also costly to change (see below on this). Ther efore, institutions that are efficient for a set of circumstances may no longer be efficient once the environment hinges. Nevertheless, it may be difficult or too costly to change these institutions at this point.The idea here goes back to Crosschecking (1963). In the context of financial institutions, Crosschecking argued that certain arrangements, such as bank finance, might be more appropriate for backward countries trying to catch up. This is widely thought to be a good explanation for why banks are more prevalent in Germany, even today when Germany is no longer a backward country. So perhaps, social arrangements that were introduced at some point as an optimal response to the resistances may continue to prevail, even after they cease to be the optimal response.In the context of financial institutions, this point is developed in Guacamole, Action and Kilobit (2001). Another economic example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. David (1986) argued that this was appropriate at the t ime because it slowed down the speed of typing, when the rudimentary nature of typewriters meant that rapid typing would make them Jam. However, despite the fact that the QWERTY arrangement was inefficient once the basic technology improved soon after, it has similar thesis.Perhaps, extractive institutions were appropriate for certain resistances, but they continue to apply even after they cease to be the efficient institutional arrangement. Related ideas have been suggested in the literature. For example, Wittingly (1957) argued that centralized despotism, which may not have been very costly in terms of economic outcomes in China before the 1 5th century and arose as the result of providing desirable public goods such as irrigation, persisted almost to the present, creating a substantial economic and social burden.Given how long institutions persist (see Section ‘V) the view that institutions of a different age ay continue to apply even when they become costly to economic suc cess is highly plausible. Nevertheless, in the context of comparative development, it appears more useful to combine the inappropriate institutions view with the rent-seeking view, explicitly allowing for political elites to introduce inefficient institutions. In fact, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we suggested a hypothesis combining the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views, and provided evidence in favor of this hypothesis.We argued and empirically demonstrated that extractive institutions, tit power concentrated in the hand of a small elite, were much less costly during the age of agriculture than during the age of industry. When agriculture is the main source of income, and the political elite owns the land, this elite will have, to a first approximation, adequate incentives to increase the productivity of the land. In contrast, in the age of industry, many different agents, not previously part of the ruling elite, need to undertake investments and be involved in productive activities.Without effective property rights, these agents are unlikely to invest, so extractive institutions become much more costly once industrialization opportunities arrive on the scene. This explains why the sugar colonies of Barbados, Haiti and Jamaica were amongst the richest places in the world in 1700 but rapidly fell behind when industrial technologies became available. Overall, we therefore conclude that to understand the significant differences in how countries are organized, we need to move away from the pure efficiency view.Moreover, existing series of institutional differences based on the incidental institutions view cannot provide a satisfactory tarring point, and make less sharp empirical predictions, since institutions are simply byproducts of other social actions. Instead, we believe that conflict over the distribution of rents matters, and the rent seeking view provides the best starting place for an analysis of institutional differences across countries.In addition, there may be an important element of the inappropriate institutions view, so that institutions that were introduced at a certain point in time may become less appropriate and more â€Å"harmful† in the future, but may still remain in place. Ill. Institutional Origins The rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views do not immediately generate a theory of comparative institutions. They simply point out that inefficient institutions may be chosen by political elites, and the institutions in place may become more costly for growth over time.As discussed above, by the institutions hypothesis, we mean that differences in the development experiences of countries can be explained by differences in their institutions. To make this hypothesis operational, we need to choose institutions of private property. In other words, we need to develop comparative static on institution building. This is not an easy task. In fact, some of the pioneering theories of institutions, such as North (1981), give us few clues about when we should expect extractive institutions to prevail.Here, we highlight a few potential determinants of what type of institutions politically powerful groups will choose: 1. Economic Interests: A first determinant of whether institutions of private property will emerge is whether they will lead to outcomes that are in interests of the politically powerful agents. For example, institutions that restrict state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler ho wants to appropriate assets in the future.Yet this strategy may be in the interest of a ruler who recognizes that only such guarantees will encourage citizens to undertake substantial investments or lend him money, or will protect his own rents. They will also be in the interest of the major groups that can undertake investment in production activities in the future. Anger and Solidify explanation for why extractive institutions emerged in the Caribbean but not in North America falls within this category. In the Caribbean, the factor endowments made extractive institutions more profitable for the elite.In particular, sugar production, which could exploit economies of scale and profitably employ slave labor, was conducive to a society where a small elite would control both political and economic power. Our argument in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) for why European settlement in the colonies led to institutions of private property is also based on the same reasoning. When a large number of Europeans settled in an area, they preferred institutions enforcing property rights, since these property rights would enable them to undertake investments.Our argument in Guacamole Johnson and Robinson (2001 a) is also related. There, we suggested that high population density and relative prosperity (I. E. , GAP per capita) of the colonized territory encouraged European colonialists to set up extractive institutions. The reasoning is that high po pulation density implied a large labor force that Europeans could force to work for low wages, and both high population density and the relative prosperity of the population provided Europeans with a greater resource base for extraction or taxation. Economic interests† therefore suggest that we should expect extractive institutions to develop when the powerful agents have little to gain from enforcing property sights because they have few investment opportunities themselves and are not linked to other productive agents in the society, and when there are resources, such as crops or abundant labor, that can be effectively exploited by extractive 2.Political Losers: Another important factor is whether institutional development will destabilize the system, making it less likely that elites will remain in power after reforms. An institutional setup encouraging investment and adoption of new technologies may be blocked by elites when they fear that this process of growth and social change will